維基揭密：中國資助阿富汗神學士組織 WikiLeaks: Leaks on China conventional arms transfers to Iran

新頭殼newtalk 2010.12.11 洪聖斐/編譯報導


儘管阿富汗神學士政權早已在2001年911恐怖攻擊後不久，便被北約組織推翻，但神學士的餘黨迄今仍然活躍，不但控制一些地區，而且火力強大。本期《航空週刊》(Aviation Week)相信，中國顧問協助了神學士餘黨取得軍火與通訊器材。

一位英國軍官向撰寫這篇報導的記者說，有人看到中國專家訓練神學士武裝人員使用地對空飛彈。「維基揭密」最近公布了一則美國官員於2008年5月13日所發出的密電，也證實了美方曾針對中國輸出飛彈的問題詰問過中國官員。美國的密電顯示，中國製的軍火經由伊朗，被運送到阿富汗和給伊拉克的恐怖份子手中。


然而，一位美國資深情報官則認為，中國比較可能會做的是蒐集情報，而不會直接把軍火賣給這些叛亂團體。否則一旦被抓到，他們長久以來營造的對美關係，將會受到嚴重的打擊，白白授予極右翼把中國描繪為大惡人的良機。這位情報官認為，中國人到神學士組織活動的主要目的，應該是去進行情蒐工作。

根據維基揭密所公開的資料，美國駐吉爾吉斯大使格菲勒(Tatiana Gfoeller)曾在2009年初詰問過中國大使張延年，中方為何以美金30億元現鈔賄賂吉爾吉斯政府去窺探吉國借給美國的瑪那茲（Manas）空軍基地。張延年沒有否認拿錢給吉爾吉斯，只強調中國堅定反恐。那位美軍情報官認為，中國感興趣的不是美國的阿富汗行動，而是吉爾吉斯與中國的新疆接壤，美軍在此地活動會讓中國特別注意。

但其他的觀察家則認為中國所要的並非僅只於情蒐，而是協助將國際軍火運送到伊朗以及其他礦產資源豐富的中東及非洲國家。維基揭密所公布的一份2008年密電顯示，美國官員被訓令要求數國政府阻止一架北韓飛機前往伊朗，不允許該機通行，要求它降落並接受檢查。後來，吉爾吉斯果然拒絕這架飛機通行，並通報美國。

WikiLeaks: Leaks on China conventional arms transfers to Iran

Viewing cable 08STATE50524, CHINA CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS TO IRAN

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Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
08STATE50524	2008-05-13 15:03	2010-12-06 21:09	SECRET//NOFORN	Secretary of State

O P 131528Z MAY 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE
INFO PAGE 02        STATE   050524  131535Z
AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 050524 

NOFORN 

EO 12958 DECL: 05/05/2018 
TAGS PARM, PREL 

SUBJECT: CHINA CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS TO IRAN 

REF: A. STATE 162318  
繞B. STATE 109649  
繞C. BEIJING 5237  
繞D. STATE 071143 
繞E. STATE 073601  
繞F. BEIJING 5754  
繞G. STATE 72896  
繞H. BEIJING 5361  
繞I. STATE 148514  
繞J. BEIJING 6848  
繞K. STATE 159388  
繞L. BEIJING 7212  M. BEIJING 7387

Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY ISN ACTING DAS ELIOT KANG FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

 繞1. (U) This is an action request. Embassy Beijing, please see paragraph 2.

-------------- 
ACTION REQUEST
-------------- 

繞2. (S/NF) Post is requested to draw on the points in para 4 below and to provide photographs in a demarche to the Government of China (GOC) on the issue of transfers of advanced conventional weapons such as MANPADS to Iran. NOTE THAT THE POINTS FLAGGED AS PROVIDED BY THE IC MUST BE USED VERBATIM.

---------- 
BACKGROUND
----------
 
繞3. (S/NF) In April 2008, Coalition forces recovered from a cache in Basra, Iraq at least two Chinese-produced Iranian-supplied QW-1 MANPADS that we assess were provided by Iran to Iraqi Shia militants. The date of production for the recovered QW-1 systems is 2003, but it is not known when these particular launchers were transferred by China to Iran or when the launchers entered Iraq. We have demarched China repeatedly on its conventional arms transfers to Iran, urging Beijing to stop these transfers due to unacceptably high risk that such weapons would be diverted to militants and terrorists in Iraq and elsewhere. Beijing has typically responded by asserting that its sales are in accordance with international law, that it requires end-users to sign agreements pledging not to retransfer the weapons, or -- disingenuously in the judgment of USG technical experts -- that it cannot confirm that the weapons recovered by Coalition forces in Iraq are actually Chinese in origin. This latest recovery of Chinese-origin weapons in Iraq gives us yet another opportunity to present the Chinese government with concrete evidence that Iran is illicitly diverting Chinese-origin weapons and to urge Beijing to take concrete steps to halt future diversions and investigate past transfers to Tehran.

-------------- 
TALKING POINTS
-------------- 

繞4. (S/REL CHINA) BEGIN TALKING POINTS:
TRANSFERS OF MANPADS TO IRAN
----------------------------- 
-- We have repeatedly raised with you our concerns regarding Iran,s retransfer of Chinese-produced weapons to extremists and terrorists in Iraq and elsewhere.
-- We understand that you have provided Iran with QW-1 MANPADS in the past, and Iran has publicly asserted that it produces the Misagh-1, which is based on the Chinese QW-1.
-- We previously raised with you the recovery in Iraq in 2004 of an Iranian-origin Misagh-1 MANPAD that had been fired at a civilian airliner.
-- We have recently acquired additional information about Iranian diversions of Chinese-origin MANPADS that we would like to share with you.
BEGIN IC POINTS THAT MUST BE USED VERBATIM:
-- Coalition forces recovered at least two Chinese QW-1 MANPADS missiles from a militant cache in Basra, Iraq in April 2008. The missiles had 2003 production markings, had not been fired, and were still intact in their launch tubes.
-- We assess that these missiles were provided to Iraqi Shia militants by Iran.

END IC POINTS THAT MUST BE USED VERBATIM.
MANPADS TRANSFERS TO STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM
--------------------------------------------- --- 

-- Iran is the world? most active state sponsor of terrorism. We know that Iran has provided Chinese weapons to extremist groups in Iraq and Afghanistan that are using these weapons to kill Americans and Iraqis, something we take very seriously.
-- Iran is not a responsible purchaser of military equipment.  There is an unacceptably high risk that any military equipment sold to Iran, especially weapons like MANPADS, that are highly sought-after by terrorists, will be diverted to non-state actors who threaten U.S. and Coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as civilians across the region.
-- It is for that reason UNSCR 1747 calls on states to exercise vigilance and restraint in the transfer of systems contained in the UN Register of Conventional Arms, such as MANPADS. Likewise, the United Nations General Assembly passed resolution A/62/391 encouraging state members to ban the transfer of MANPADS to non-state actors.
-- We strongly urge you to:
terminate all weapons-related, including further MANPADS-related transfers and technical assistance to Iran, in accordance with UNSCR 1747;
insist that Iran cease any weapons-production related activities based on or including Chinese technology, to include MANPADS technology;
insist that Iran stop illicit retransfers of Chinese-origin weapons, or Iranian-produced weapons based on Chinese designs, to non-state actors;
insist that Iran provide an accounting of all Chinese-origin weapons; and institute thorough, regular inspections of Chinese-origin weapons already in Iranian stocks to determine how many may have been diverted and to prevent future diversions.
-- We ask that you share with us the results of your investigations into this matter.

SERIAL NUMBERS OF WEAPONS SOLD TO IRAQ:
------------------------------------------ 

-- We have provided you with information on specific Chinese weapons systems that we have recovered in Iraq.
-- Further information you can provide to us on your sales of these systems to Iran would help our investigators on the ground distinguish between weapons newly transferred to Shia militants and those transferred prior to the commencement of armed conflict in 2003. Serial numbers of equipment sold to Iran would be most helpful in this regard.

END TALKING POINTS. RICE
NNNN